Introduction
Agricultural production in China has grown rapidly-relative to other countriesover the past four decades. Much of this growth can be attributed to investments in agricultural research by national and regional governments combined with policy reform and increased use of inputs. 1 After 50 years of development, the Chinese agricultural research system is now arguably the largest in the world, employing over 50,000 senior scientists and spending more than US$3.8 billion in 2002 (measured in 1995 international dollars). 2 However, the system is currently facing a dilemma. Chinese agricultural production is becoming increasingly dependent on new technologies generated by research, especially as agricultural land and other natural resources become more limiting factors. The quantity of agricultural land-and high-quality land in particular-will only decline further in the future with rapid industrialization and urbanization. At the same time, a national policy introduced in the mid-1980s has encouraged research institutes to become financially self-supporting. As a result, on the positive side, research has become more integrated with economic development because research institutes have sought financial support by selling their services. On the negative side, however, areas of research not easily commercialized, including significant aspects of agricultural research, face financial problems as governments at various levels reduce funding for R&D.
The objectives of this chapter are to review the evolution of the organizational structure, institutional management, and financing of the Chinese agricultural research system and to explore reform options to promote future agricultural growth and food security and reduce poverty. We first review the trend in agricultural production and productivity growth in Chinese agriculture, using newly available data and new aggregation methods. We then discuss the institutional and policy environment of the Chinese agricultural R&D system. Next, we analyze major issues in the provision and financing of agricultural R&D in China. This analysis is followed by two case studies: one of a national research institute, and the other of a provincial institute. Finally, we offer some policy choices regarding reform of the existing system in light of emerging challenges in the 21st century.
Production and Productivity in Chinese Agriculture
Over the past several decades, and particularly since 1978, the Chinese economy has performed spectacularly well. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 6.2 percent per year from 1952 to 2002. Prior to 1978, the growth rate was only 3.4 percent, but between 1978 and 2002 it jumped to 8.2 percent per year (China Statistical Yearbook, various years). The economy has also undergone dramatic and continuing structural change.
In 1952, agriculture accounted for more than half the national GDP, while urban industry and services accounted for 21 and 29 percent, respectively (Table  3 .1). The Chinese economy was largely agrarian. By 2002, however, agriculture had declined to around 15 percent of GDP-a rapid decline of about two-thirds of 30 FAN, QIAN, AND ZHANG a percentage point per year. Labor shifts among sectors have been striking. In 1952, more than 80 percent of the national labor force was in agriculture, only 6 percent in urban industry, and 10 percent in the urban service sector. By 2002, less than half the labor force was engaged in agricultural activities; more than 21 percent worked in the industrial sector and 29 percent in the service sector. Agricultural production has grown at a much faster pace in China than in most other countries for the past 50 years. The yield of rice, the staple of the Chinese diet, has increased from 1.9 tons to 6.3 tons per hectare, a rate of increase of 2.24 percent per year (Figure 3 .1). The yield of wheat, another important crop in China, grew even faster, from 0.6 to 3.9 tons per hectare, or 3.4 percent per year. Overall agricultural production grew by 3.3 percent per year from 1952 to 1997 (Figure 3.2) . Growth in grain output and production value has been much higher than the population growth over the same period, so that the amount and value of output per capita has increased. 3 A large proportion of this growth can be attributed to productivity improvement, which in turn comes primarily from new technologies released by the national agricultural research system. Over the period 1952 to 1997, growth in productivity 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1981 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 Rice Wheat Corn Soybeans Tubers
Source: National Statistical Bureau, various years.
Note: Rice is measured as paddy rice.
accounted for an estimated 47 percent of total production growth in agriculture (Fan and Zhang 2002) . Prior to 1979, increased input use accounted for 95 percent of the growth in output, while productivity improvement accounted for only 5 percent. But after 1979, productivity growth accounted for 71 percent of the production growth, while increased input use accounted for less than 30 percent. 4 This trend indicates that future growth in agricultural production will rely on continued productivity improvements.
The Institutional and Policy Environment
One of the distinguishing characteristics of agricultural research in China is the dominance of public research conducted in national and provincial academies, Index (1952 Index ( = 100) 1952 Index ( 1958 Index ( 1955 Index ( 1964 Index ( 1961 Index ( 1970 Index ( 1967 Index ( 1976 Index ( 1973 Index ( 1982 Index ( 1979 Index ( 1988 Index ( 1985 Index ( 1994 Index ( 1991 Index ( 1997 and an adjusted meat and fisheries output. Input is the index of total input aggregated using the Tornqvist-Theil approach. TFP is the total factor productivity index, the ratio of total output (output 2) to total input, both constructed using the Tornqvist-Theil index.
prefectural institutes of agricultural sciences, and agricultural universities. Related county-level activities deal with technology transfer issues, such as demonstration trials, farmer education, and other extension-related work. Private agricultural research is minimal, although private agricultural research and development initiatives have begun to emerge in recent years. Like many other sectors of the economy, the Chinese agricultural research system underwent substantial reforms in the last decade of the 20th century. The objectives (or at least the stated intentions) of these reforms were to make the system more efficient and more responsive to the needs of the agricultural sector in particular, and to the development of the economy more generally, while reducing the core public funding provided to research institutes in the context of increasing demand for government funds. These reforms resulted in the emergence of nongovernmental funding for agricultural research. In terms of the ownership of R&D institutes and sources of funding, it is useful to distinguish between five types of agricultural research institutions in China: traditional publicly funded and managed research institutes, development firms owned by public agricultural research institutes, government-owned agribusiness firms, shareholder companies, and multinational companies.
Public-Sector Research Institutes
Public-sector research institutes still form the backbone of the Chinese agricultural research system, despite the rapid emergence of other types of research institutions. Public agricultural research at the national level is conducted mainly within academies and institutes under the Ministry of Agriculture, complemented by the research efforts of various institutes under the administrative control of other ministries. Provincial agricultural academies conduct research targeted primarily at local circumstances. At the prefectural level, the emphasis is on applied and adaptive research and development. The principal research entity is the prefectural agricultural research institute, which is generally administered by the prefectural government. Research at this level is important given the relatively large size of prefectures in China.
The Chinese system is highly decentralized in terms of both management and funding (Table 3. 2). Based on 2002 data, only about 12 percent of the scientists and engineers (excluding university personnel) are employed by national institutes. A large proportion of researchers (49 percent) work in institutes administered and often largely financed at the provincial level, while the remaining 39 percent work in prefectural institutes. There is a marked disparity in the average size of the institutes: the national institutes employ an average of 70 scientists per institute, the provincial institutes half this number, and prefectural institutes just 19 scientists A distinctive aspect of the agricultural research system in China is that research is institutionally separated from education and extension. The Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS) falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture; provincial academies are under the jurisdiction of parallel departments in provincial governments. Prior to 2000, there were seven key national agricultural universities (China [formerly Beijing], Nanjing, Shenyang, Northwest, Central, South, and Southwest), also under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture. Provincial agricultural universities were managed by their respective provincial governments. But in 2000, the management of all agricultural universities was transferred to the education system. At the national level, three key agricultural universities-China, Nanjing, and Central-are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, while provincial agricultural universities or colleges come under the supervision of the provincial department of education. Extension is the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture, with very little involvement by provincial agricultural universities or academies of agricultural sciences. This system contrasts sharply with the U.S. land-grant system, which integrates educational, research, and extension activities. The separation between research, education, and extension has inhibited the integration of technology generation and transfer activities into Chinese agriculture.
Development Firms Owned by Public Agricultural Research Institutes
Increasing demand for agricultural research funding strained government budgets in the mid-1980s. Moreover, the government was dissatisfied with the performance of the agricultural research agencies. Overstaffing, compartmentalization, lack of coordination, and duplication of research efforts left the impression that agricultural research was an expensive and not very effective form of government investment. In particular, the government was concerned about the weak linkage between research and the needs of producers and the low rate of technology adoption.
In March 1985, the Communist Party's Central Committee called for an overhaul of the Chinese R&D system. Many reforms were proposed in the official government document titled "Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System," and a similar decision was promulgated by the State Council in 1987. Since then there have been about 40 government decisions, regulations, and laws involving reforms of the science and technology system. The main initiatives spelled out in the 1985 and 1987 government documents included changing the basis by which research institutes were funded, encouraging the commercialization of technology and the development of technology markets, and rewarding individual scientists based on their performance. The overriding purpose of the reforms was to make the science sector more responsive to rapidly changing market and economic realities. The principal reform was to modify the funding mechanism in ways that encouraged research institutes to establish contacts with technology users and to conduct research and development that would directly support agricultural enterprises. The direct allocation of funds, consisting almost entirely of block grants to research institutes, was replaced by a mixed system of block grants supplemented with mechanisms whereby institutes competed for project funding from the government and international donors, while also marketing various services directly to farmers and others.
After the 1985 reforms, many research institutes began establishing commercial enterprises or firms. However, the impact of these commercial endeavors on Chinese agricultural innovation has been mixed. At first, these firms were not independent legal entities. Moreover, their businesses were not necessarily related to their research but were developed opportunistically, involving any business or commercial activity that seemed likely to generate revenues. For example, the Institute of Taihu and the Institute of Lixiahe in Jiangsu province, both well known in China for their excellent research programs, produced mineral water and manufactured spare parts for automobiles, respectively. Many institutes at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences own restaurants, grocery stores, and commercial office complexes, but a lack of capital and management skills resulted in low profits and exposed many research institutes to significant business risks, which they are generally ill equipped to handle. An example was the China National Rice Research Institute in Hangzhou, which began manufacturing monosodium glutamate in 1988. It eventually lost more than 10 million yuan and was saddled with many legal and financial problems. The factory recently went bankrupt.
Another limitation was that many researchers were inexperienced in extension or in dealing with farmers about commercial issues. Those who are active and successful in their research resent the diversion because it detracts from their research time, whereas those prepared to become involved in the transfer of research technology often receive little or no financial reward for their efforts. This separation between research and extension remains unresolved, although the commercial activities and spin-offs of many public research institutes have, in part, substituted for the lack of formal links between extension and research.
Finally, many farmers were either unable or unprepared to pay for technology. In some cases, where high-quality seed or propagation material of perennial crops such as fruit trees was offered, payment was less of a problem, but where the advice or technology was related to an activity regarded as public-good research, farmers expected it to be provided free of charge.
Since the mid-1990s, based on the experience of the previous five to ten years, many public agricultural research institutes have focused their business activities on research-related industries (such as seed, chemicals, vaccines, and so on) to strengthen their competitiveness. They have also begun to set up legally independent companies to avoid direct exposure to risk. The operations of the parent institutes and their associated commercial businesses have become more clearly separated. For example, the seed company of the Institute of Vegetables and Flowers (IVF) at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science (CAAS) was established in 1990. Scientists at IVF are responsible for developing and field-testing new varieties. As promising new parent lines for hybrid vegetable seeds are developed, they are made available to the seed company of IVF, which then conducts demonstrations in targeted markets, produces hybrid seeds, and finally markets them. Since 1990, the seed company has earned more than 10 million yuan annually, and about 90 percent of the revenue has been returned to the IVF. The IVF allocates 10 percent of this income to the breeders as a bonus, and the balance is used to cover general research and operational costs.
These commercial enterprises have not only been instrumental in transferring and commercializing technology developed by their parent institutes, as was expected and encouraged by the government, but have also generated substantial revenues to help underwrite the operations of their parent institutes. In 2000, 73 companies at CAAS generated 120.5 million yuan in profit, complementing 243.4 million yuan in core funding from the central government.
Agribusiness Firms Owned by Governments
Revenue-generating businesses include state-owned seed, agricultural, food, chemical, and machinery enterprises. In the former planned economy, these companies received technologies free of charge from the public agricultural research institutes. Since the 1985 reforms, many public research institutes have opted to commercialize their own research and generate income to subsidize their costs, leading to significant awareness of the intellectual property rights (IPR) aspects of agricultural R&D (Koo et al. 2003) . Consequently it has become increasingly difficult for agribusinesses to freely access technologies from the public research institutes. In response, some large state-owned companies have negotiated research contracts with public research institutes to license the use of their technologies (involving various up-front, lump-sum payments or per-unit fees based on subsequent sales), while others have opted to develop their own in-house R&D capacities.
An absence of data means that the total R&D investment made by stateowned agribusiness is unknown. A case study of the Chinese seed industry (Qian 1999) indicated that no improved varieties were developed by companies prior to 1985. In contrast, in 1999, 86 improved varieties were released by state-owned and private companies, although these accounted for less than 2 percent of the total varieties released.
Shareholder Companies
Shareholder companies aligned with agricultural technologies have emerged rapidly in recent years. Most of these companies grew out of the development firms founded by public research institutes or agribusiness firms owned by governments. As they grew, many were listed on the stock market to mobilize operating capital. For example, the former Technology Development Company, a very successful development firm owned by the Hunan Academy of Agricultural Sciences, became a listed company in 2000 and mobilized about 700 million yuan from shareholders. The former national livestock company and the fisheries company (both previously owned by the Ministry of Agriculture) also became listed companies in 2000, with a majority holding retained by the government. These three companies each invested several million yuan in agricultural R&D in 2000.
The central government designated 151 of the country's largest agricultural companies as leading companies in agriculture in 2000, most of which were shareholder companies. The government gave these companies preferential policy treatment, including tax exemptions and low-interest loans, conditional on their investing a certain portion of their revenue in agricultural R&D.
Multinational Companies
According to , technology flows through multinational firms have led to rapid gains in productivity and output in China's agricultural sector. 5 These firms may play a larger role in the future, given China's recent entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). For example, modern technology has been introduced in the poultry industry by importing parental genetic stock and breeding materials and by the introduction of superior animal feed milling and mixing methods, coupled with the development of improved poultry genetics.
But the insecure nature of property rights in China means that much potential remains to be realized from the involvement of multinational companies. Various laws and regulations are in place to protect property rights, but their enforcement is weak (Koo et al. 2003) . So far, most of the plant breeding and screening research by foreign firms has been on hybridized vegetables and sunflower seeds, because these varieties are hard to duplicate as long as the hybrid parents are kept confidential. In addition, these seeds are not monopolized by the state-owned seed companies; in contrast, the sale of seeds for principal food crops (especially hybrid rice and maize, in which seed quality is difficult to assure) has been strictly limited to the state-owned seed companies, although these restrictions have been relaxed recently. Large private seed companies are now able to market seed varieties that they have developed or acquired.
The weak enforcement of intellectual property rights is a major concern for corporations with duplicable technologies. Profitable markets have developed for some pesticide firms whose products contain active ingredients that are complex and difficult to duplicate, while other pesticides are readily copied (some illegally) and sold at low prices. Transnational corporations that can prevent technology loss by technical means do so; but agrochemicals are widely reported to be reverse engineered. Even when technology can be protected and market demand is high, fragmented retailing and wholesaling networks limit market penetration .
Provision and Financing of Agricultural R&D Spending on Agricultural Research
Research expenditures. The amount of investment in agricultural research was quite modest during the first five-year plan , averaging 130 million 1999 yuan, although the national government actively promoted the establishment of a number of agricultural research institutes (Table 3. 3). This was followed by the Great Leap Forward, a program by which the government sought to jump-start the development process through the mass mobilization of people and financial resources in large public-works endeavors. As a consequence of these policies, the investment by the central government throughout the Chinese economy ballooned to unrealistic and unsustainable levels, with expenditures on agricultural research more than doubling in just three years, beginning in 1958. The ensuing policy readjustments, instigated in 1961, reduced 1962 agricultural research expenditures to less than 50 percent of those prevailing just two years earlier.
From this lower level, public investment in agricultural research in China steadily increased until the Cultural Revolution, which began in 1966. Research expenditures again contracted sharply, and the earlier growth in research personnel ceased. Not until 1972 did the system return to a more stable and balanced pattern (Huang et al. 2001 ). This growth rate was three to four times higher than the growth in overall agricultural research expenditures during the same period.
Share in total government expenditures. Agricultural research expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure was relatively low in the 1950s, ranging from 0.11 percent during 1953-57 to 0.38 percent during 1958-60. Since then it has been quite constant, peaking at 0.56 percent during 1977-85. Expenditure on agricultural research as a percentage of total national R&D expenditure was also quite constant, except during 1966-76 and in 2002, when it was at its smallest for the past several decades. Overall, China's share of total R&D spending directed toward agriculture has fluctuated between 10 to 14 percent. In contrast, research expenditure as a percentage of government spending on agriculture has generally increased over time, from about 1.49 percent during the years 1953 to 1957 to 8.42 percent for the years 1995 to 2000. This indicates that, within the agricultural sector, the government has placed increasing emphasis on research and development. The recent decline in agricultural R&D as a share of government spending on agriculture reflects a more rapid increase in government spending on agriculture relative to the growth in government spending on agricultural R&D.
Research intensity. Agricultural research intensity (ARI) ratios, expressing expenditure on public sector agricultural research as a proportion of the value of agricultural product, are commonly used indicators of the support to national agricultural research systems (NARSs). China's agricultural research-intensity ratio (0.55 percent) was above the less-developed country (weighted) average of 0.47 percent in the early 1960s (Pardey, Roseboom, and Anderson 1991) . Even during the Cultural Revolution, China maintained a respectable official level of investment in agricultural research. Since then, the ratio has decreased, reflecting an extraordinarily rapid growth in agricultural output and a generally slower growth in agricultural R&D spending. By the late 1990s, the latest period for which comparative data are available, China's ARI (0.34 percent in 1995-2000) was about half the developing country average (0.62 percent in 1995) and roughly one-eighth of the developedcountry average for public research (2.64 percent in 1995) . In 2002, China's ARI jumped to 0.49 percent, reflecting a 35 percent increase in agricultural research expenditures since 2000, as against a 5.7 percent increase in agricultural GDP. This rapid increase in agricultural research investment reflects the government's intention of using science and technology as a means of increasing food security and improving agricultural productivity and efficiency under an increasingly open and internationally competitive agricultural trade regime.
Funding Mechanism and Sources of Agricultural Research Funding Mechanisms
The State Planning Commission finalizes the annual budgets for all ministerial spending at the national level. It also authorizes the disbursement of central government funds to the various ministries, as well as to the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC). The SSTC is in turn responsible for allocating the science and technology funds at its disposal to the various agricultural and nonagricultural ministries and national research agencies such as the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and, to a limited extent, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Science (CAAS). At these upper levels of government, allocation procedures are largely driven by precedent and political considerations. Within the respective ministries and agricultural research agencies (such as CAAS), there are currently no formally established or transparent mechanisms for setting research priorities and allocating funds. Project funds that support labor and operational costs have been increasingly allocated through competitive funding mechanisms. For example, funds from the National Natural Sciences Foundation, National Social Sciences Foundation, National Young Scientists Foundation, and other government funding agencies are allocated based on peer reviews.
Funding mechanisms at the provincial and prefectural levels parallel those at the national (or, in Chinese parlance, state) level. Some national funds flow to local government agencies, in some instances from the national to the provincial institutes in support of collaborative research activities. But because government financing within China is highly decentralized, the funds available to provincial and prefectural planning commissions are principally generated through locally administered public financing instruments (for example, taxes on industry and commerce, agricultural land taxes, and resource extraction taxes).
Funding for most research institutes consists of both core and project funds. Core funds, which are mainly used for salaries, are allocated to various organizations by central and local finance departments at the various levels of government, on the recommendations of their counterpart Science and Technology Commissions.
Funding Sources
Prior to the mid-1980s, government funds were the dominant source of support for agricultural research, and even in 1987 they still accounted for more than 70 percent of the total agricultural research expenditures (Table 3 .4). Since the reforms of the mid-1980s, research institutes have been encouraged to generate income by providing services to other units or by fulfilling assigned research tasks. Part of these earnings may be retained for use as science and technology research funds by the research units that generate them. As a result, the government's share of total funding has declined dramatically, and development income (meaning income earned from commercial activities) has become almost as important as core government funding. In 1999, only about half the total funding for the system was from the government. Almost 45 percent was income generated by research institutes from services and commercial activities that increasingly draw on the technologies arising from R&D. It is likely that an even greater share of the funds available for agricultural R&D will come from such sources, given the incentives to underreport such funding: for example, an institute associated with a national academy such as CAAS must pay a proportion of its self-generated income (perhaps up to 30 percent) to the academy. Development income is often used by research institutes to subsidize researchers' salaries and other benefits, although it is rarely used directly for research. In recent years the government has ratcheted up its support to science and technology, partly because of improvements in the overall budget situation and partly because it has placed a higher priority on science-based growth strategies. And, perhaps more important, policymakers have begun to realize the public-good dimensions of agricultural research. Consequently, in 2002, government funding jumped to more than 60 percent of the total income received by agricultural research institutes, while the share of development income declined to 29 percent.
Allocation of Research Funds among Subsectors
China has given top priority to crop research, particularly in grain crops, for the past several decades. In 2002, China spent 51 percent of total agricultural research resources on crop research, declining from a peak of 65 percent in 1989 (Table 3. 
5).
This trend is consistent with the changing contribution of crops to total production value (54 percent in 2002). Livestock research accounts for only about 10 percent of total research resources, but the sector accounts for almost 30 percent of the total production value. The fisheries sector accounts for about 7 percent of total research resources but more than 10 percent of the total production value. On the other hand, the forestry sector accounts for only 3.7 percent of total production value but double that in terms of its share of research resources. Based on congruence between the share of research expenditures and the value of the respective sector, there appears to be a substantial overinvestment in forestry research and underinvestment in the livestock and fisheries sectors. Although a more careful study is needed to make definitive conclusions, it appears that China needs to invest more in livestock and fishery research. This shift will be particularly important in the future, as these two subsectors will be the major sources of growth in agricultural production.
Institutional Case Studies The Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences
Founded in 1957, CAAS is the national academy engaged in agricultural R&D, excluding forestry and fisheries. It constitutes the largest and arguably most impor-tant agricultural R&D institution in China. To a large extent, the structure and performance of CAAS reflect the government's policies on research in general and are therefore indicative of the future of Chinese agricultural research.
This section reviews key aspects of the reforms of CAAS by analyzing the changes in organizational structure, human resource management, funding sources, research priorities, and development and commercial activities.
Organizational structure. CAAS is administratively affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) but is largely influenced by the R&D policy of the Ministry of Sciences and Technology (MOST). In terms of bureaucratic hierarchy, the president of CAAS is ostensibly equivalent to the vice minister of the MOA, but CAAS has no direct administrative control over the provincial academies of agricultural sciences. CAAS is an independent legal entity, consisting of 8 departments at its headquarters, 1 graduate school, 1 publishing house, and 39 institutes (15 located in Beijing and 24 in various provinces across China).
All the institutes under CAAS are independent legal entities, operating autonomously in terms of fund-raising, staff recruitment, and daily operations, but the director general and deputy director general of each institute are appointed by CAAS headquarters. A typical institute has 1 director general, 2 to 4 deputies, 4 management offices-administration, human resources, research management, and development-and 8 to 15 research divisions. Human resources. Table 3 .6 presents the personnel structure of CAAS during the period 1994 to 2001. The total number of personnel increased slightly, with reductions occurring in the number of research, management, and support staff. Notably, the business staff increased markedly, and the number of retirees soared from 2,878 to 4,962 in the period observed. Over time, as in most Chinese public institutes, these retirees have taken a larger share of the CAAS payroll and become a significant budgetary burden. 6 Although the total number of staff fell, the number with higher degrees rose. Staff holding Ph.D.s increased from 136 in 1994 to 371 in 2001 (Table 3 .7). The number holding bachelor's and master's degrees also grew in proportion to the total number of R&D staff. Research priorities. CAAS's mandate is to undertake basic, so-called basic applied, and applied research and development of strategic importance to China. In reality, however, most of the research is quite applied. Table 3 .8 shows CAAS's research orientation as reflected by its expenditures between 1994 and 2000. Even in real terms, CAAS expenditures have grown remarkably. Evaluated in 1994 constant prices, total spending increased from 36.08 million yuan in 1994 to 158.65 million yuan in 2000. Although the proportions of CAAS spending directed to other types of research expenditure have increased, applied and developmental research (Table 3 .8, data columns 2 and 3) still dominate, accounting for almost two-thirds of the CAAS total.
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Development activities. Managerial and support staff numbers were cut by 27 percent between 1994 and 2001 as a direct consequence of reforms. Most of these staff were transferred to development or commercial activities, and the income generated from these activities accounted for a larger share of the total income. The number of staff engaged in development and commercial activities rose from 927 to 1,428 over the same period, accounting for 9 percent of total staff. The income from development and commercial activities increased by 56.5 percent to a total of 23.94 million yuan in 2001 (1994 prices) .
Most of the commercial undertakings took the form of spin-off companies rather than revenue-raising efforts through technology licensing or royalty arrangements. As of 2001, there were 72 companies operating within CAAS, with each of the academy's institutes operating about two enterprises. As previously mentioned, these companies are closely linked with their parent institutes, making use of institute staff to commercialize and market the research products of the respective institutes. A share of the profits reverts to the parent institute to subsidize salaries and operational costs. In 2001, the 72 companies generated about 42 percent of CAAS's total revenue. The companies not only generate revenues to supplement public funding but also promote the application of research more relevant to onand off-farm production needs.
Funding sources. Between 1994 and 2001, public funding for CAAS more than doubled, from 192.37 million to 400.76 million yuan (Table 3 .9). Nongovernment funding increased fivefold, from 51.26 million yuan to 313.16 million yuan, most of which was generated through commercial activities. The proportion of government funding decreased from 71.2 percent to 55.7 percent, while nongovernment funding increased from 19 percent to 43.6 percent. As the advancing reforms intended, CAAS could no longer rely on public funding alone, and it seems the reforms have effectively diversified the academy's funding channels.
Research output. A key question is whether the diversification in funding sources and implementation of new incentive systems have adversely affected research productivity. China has yet to develop an evaluation system to assess the performance of the research institutes. increased only slightly between 1994 and 2000. By 2001, the number of published scientific papers totaled 21,156, including 1,625 published abroad. In contrast, the number of published books has increased dramatically, but in China books are generally not refereed or peer-reviewed and hence are much easier to publish than refereed papers. In the current performance-evaluation system, books are ranked at least as high as refereed articles. The number of patent applications in China grew steadily between 1994 and 2001. Since 1996, CAAS has submitted more than 167 patent applications to the National Patent Agency, indicating, perhaps, that CAAS researchers are coming to appreciate the implications of protecting intellectual property when commercializing innovations. Each year during this period the CAAS's research projects won about 10 national prizes, 20 regional or local prizes, and more than 50 provincial and ministry prizes.
In summary, in the eight years up to 2001, tracking the number of publications or patent approvals produced no clear indication that research productivity at CAAS has been materially affected by the changed circumstances.
The Jiangsu Provincial Academy of Agricultural Science
Jiangsu is one of the most advanced provinces in China in terms of agricultural production and research. The Jiangsu Academy of Agricultural Science (JAAS) is the largest of the provincial agricultural academies, with more than 2,000 full-time employees in 1998 (Qian, Zhu, and Fan 1997) . Because Jiangsu has been a pioneer of efforts to reform China's agricultural research and development system, it is an interesting institution to study in terms of the R&D changes taking place. 7 Institutional aspects. JAAS is a comprehensive public agricultural research institution directly administrated by the Jiangsu Provincial Government. Founded in 1932, it was originally named the National Agricultural Research Institute (NARI) because Nanjing was the national capital at the time. The early organizational structure largely mimicked the Soviet system of the 1950s, but China's transition from a planned to a market economy brought about a demand for institutional change in the agricultural R&D sector. Beginning especially in the early 1980s, the provincial agricultural R&D system in Jiangsu underwent a series of substantial reforms.
In 1982, the provincial government introduced guidelines for reform titled "Opinion on Strengthening Agricultural R&D" (see Wang 2000) . The guidelines called for research institutes located at headquarters to focus on projects broadly relevant to the ecology of the province, leaving the regional institutes to focus on more localized, adaptive research. Since then, funds have been reallocated to reflect this intent.
Based on further guidelines in 1985 from the central government for reform of the science and technology sector, the Jiangsu Provincial Government enacted a decree in 1988 to change the system of performance appraisal and promotion. Under the old system, promotions were largely determined by duration of service, whereas now-with a view to providing incentives and enhancing productivitythey are based on performance. Institutions like JAAS proposed detailed guidelines for performance evaluations. For example, single-authored journal articles carry greater weight for evaluation purposes than coauthored articles. Performance evaluation and ranking have profound implications for employees in China: they can affect all aspects of a researcher's life. Public research institutions continue to carry the responsibility for providing employees and retirees with benefits, including housing subsidies, retirement pensions, and medical care, and they allocate such benefits largely according to seniority. Consequently, a senior fellow may be eligible for a three-bedroom apartment, while a fellow may only qualify for a two-bedroom apartment. Naturally this system creates great incentives for researchers to seek promotion through publishing journal articles, preferably as a single or lead author.
Publishing scientific articles is one metric of research output; generating technologies that are commercially successful is another. In 1993, the State Science and Technology Commission and State Reform Commission proposed new guidelines in the wake of financial decentralization under the title "Some Opinions on Staff Management, Structural Adjustment, and In-Depth Reform" (see Wang 2000) . The document recommended that research institutions respond to market signals by producing outputs with more immediate economic consequences. The document also encouraged research institutes to generate revenues from development and other commercial activities. The original aim of this reform was to subsidize R&D with revenues from businesses, but many institutes passed on their development revenues to staff members, leaving little for R&D. Nevertheless, commercialization has become a major feature in Jiangsu's agricultural R&D system.
Personnel. Several features are apparent from Table 3 .11. First, the number of JAAS research staff changed little between 1988 and 1998: numbers rose from 1,105 in 1988 1,105 in to 1,216 in 1994 1,105 in , then dropped to 1,114 in 1998 ing to policy reforms, the number of managerial and support staff was cut by about 26 percent. At the same time, the number of employees involved in activities generating business income more than doubled, from 164 to 393. Third, with an aging population of researchers, the number of retirees rose from 743 to 1,447.
Excluding retirees, the total number of full-time employees at JAAS was 2,766 in 1998, a decline of 6.6 percent from 1988. Including retirees, however, the number of staff on the payroll increased by 13.8 percent from 3,703 to 4,213, with researchers accounting for only 26.4 percent of the 1998 total.
Funding and expenditures. Core government funding increased more than threefold from 1988 to 1998, from 9.2 million to 37.7 million yuan, evaluated at 1988 constant prices (Table 3 .12). Project funding fluctuated around 4.5 million yuan for the first half of the 1990s, then increased significantly in 1997 and 1998. With increased commercialization, net income from business activities rose sharply, from 1.1 million to 14.2 million yuan over the same period. In terms of expenditure, core funding was used largely to finance wages; hence the two sets of data show similar upward trends between 1988 and 1998, in response to the growth of retiree numbers. JAAS expenditure declined from 6.4 million yuan in 1988 to 2.3 million yuan by 1995, then soared to 12.2 million yuan by 1998, when the government pumped significant new funding into the agricultural R&D system following the large spike in grain imports in 1994 and 1995. Development expenditures increased markedly, from 10.3 million to 47.1 million yuan. Because of the incentive mechanisms that directly link staff incomes-particularly staff bonuses-with business revenues, researchers, managerial staff, and support staff all benefit from profit-making research activities.
In line with the national trend toward decentralizing government services, JAAS became increasingly dependent on funding from within the province rather than from the central government (Figure 3.3) . In 1988, state funding accounted for over 70 percent but by 1998 dropped to less than 50 percent. Because Jiangsu is one of the richest provinces, it was able to supplement its shrinking share of state 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1996 funding. But in many poorer provinces, agricultural research institutions face more severe budget restrictions .
Size of research projects. Table 3 .13 indicates the scale of research activities through funding per researcher and the average number of researchers per project. Because the total number of full-time researchers remained relatively stable, funding per researcher closely correlates with total funding, decreasing dramatically from 1988 to 1995 and increasing thereafter. The average number of researchers per project fell from 2.5 in 1988 to 1.4 in 1998, indicating minimal researcher collaboration. This trend is largely the result of the emphasis on first authorship in professional evaluation and promotion; however, achieving results with far-reaching significance will be particularly challenging with the majority of researchers now undertaking such small-scale research projects. In informal interviews with researchers, most expressed concern that the current incentive system inhibited larger-scale cooperative research projects, which are perceived as more uncertain in terms of funding, promotion and recognition, and outputs.
Research performance. Changes in funding sources and incentive mechanisms also affect research outputs (Table 3 .14). The benefits of sole authorship are reflected in the dramatic increase in the number of published papers and books. At the same time, large peer-reviewed research outputs, indicative of more significant, long-term projects, declined from 70 to 42.
Awards, and royalties for papers and books, can serve as an intermediate indicator of the productivity of research staff. on labor and investment input. The first indicator is output value per researcher, and the second is output value per 1,000 yuan of input. Both indicators show that productivity has changed little during the survey period despite the increase in overall funding to JAAS. Given that one of its original purposes was to supplement government funds for R&D, commercialization has been successful. However, research output (at least to the extent revealed by publication and related measures) has changed little, suggesting that the commercial revenues have not significantly increased the funds used for R&D, as originally envisioned.
A Prospective Look at China's Research Reforms
Agricultural research has played a key role in meeting the national food demand and reducing poverty, as many studies have shown (Alston et al. 2000; Fan 2000; Fan, Zhang, and Zhang 2004) . However, much remains to be achieved. China's demand for agricultural products will continue to expand (in terms of both the quantity and quality of products and shifts in the composition of food, feed, and fiber demands) in ways that remain heavily reliant on improvements in productivity. How China's agricultural research system responds to these demands will be critical; so will the research policies that can help or hinder these developments.
Increasing Public Investment in Agricultural Research
A further increase in investment in agricultural R&D is needed. Despite its comparatively rapid overall growth, China's agricultural R&D spending-relative to the size of the agricultural sector it serves-lags well behind that of many other countries. But do significant scale and scope economies go unrealized as a result of the parallel national, provincial, and prefectural systems? As of 2002, agricultural research expenditure as a percentage of agricultural GDP averaged around 0.50 percent, well below the corresponding developed-country average and even lower than in most developing countries (which averaged 0.62 percent). Various evidence shows that agricultural research investment not only yields high economic returns but also significantly reduces rural poverty and regional income inequality (Fan 2000) . Moreover, according to recent evidence, agricultural research has contributed to a large drop in urban poverty by lowering food prices (Fan, Fang, and Zhang 2003) . Absent agricultural research, China would have many more urban poor today. Finally, increased agricultural research investment is one of the most 1988 1989 1990 1992 1991 1994 1993 1995 1997 1996 1998 3. efficient ways to solve China's long-term food-security problem . All these factors suggest that increased investment in agricultural research is a "win-win-win" (growth-poverty and equity-food security) national development strategy.
Reforming the Public Research Institutes
After more than 15 years of reform, the Chinese public agricultural research system now faces new challenges. The coexistence of public research and commercial activities has played an important role in mobilizing resources to support agricultural research and in enhancing the link between agricultural research and those who ultimately use its outputs. As the system evolves, however, these symbiotic activities are often in conflict because public agricultural research aims to provide public goods and carry out basic, strategic, and not-for-profit research, whereas revenuegenerating businesses provide private goods and engage in commercial activities. Hence, the two operations would likely benefit from even more distinct and separate institutional arrangements. A more focused, efficient, and effective research system is urgently needed to achieve the multiple goals of agricultural growth, food security, and poverty reduction. The commercial activities, which are not always compatible with these goals, need to be hived off from the public research agencies. On the one hand, the government should increase its investment in public research; on the other, the current public research institutes need further reform. The major (and interrelated) problems currently confronting most of the research institutes are overstaffing, the heavy financial burden imposed by retirees, the lack of an effective incentive system, and lack of coordination between national and regional research institutes.
To avoid overstaffing, all research and administrative positions should be created on the basis of need, and all positions should be filled though public announcements and open competition. Redundant staff should be encouraged to retire and provided assistance in seeking employment elsewhere. The reform of the agricultural research system should be considered in the larger social and financial context. These challenges are largely similar to the problems of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Hence, some of the future reforms required for research are likely to proceed in step with the overall economic and institutional reforms of China's SOEs. Several schemes to reform the Chinese pension system have been proposed. For example, current and newly hired staff could be required to contribute a share of their salary to a retirement account, while contributions for retired staff could be covered by government funds. Incentive structures for researchers should be performance based. Promotion and annual salary increases should be based on more rigorous performance assessment.
The current organizational structure for agricultural research strictly parallels the country's administrative system rather than being based on agroecological or other relevant considerations. In Gongzhuning City, Jinglin Province, for example, the provincial academy of agricultural sciences and a prefectural agricultural research institute both carry out R&D on maize. Similar duplications exist in almost all provinces in China. If research resources are to be allocated more efficiently and appropriately across agroecological zones, professional linkages and coordination between institutes at different levels must be improved. One solution would be to merge institutes with similar mandates within agroecological zones-particularly within cities.
Private versus Public Research
In recent years, the focus has been on privatizing the funding for publicly performed research rather than privatizing research per se. Several factors have contributed to this trend. A high proportion of the agricultural research carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture's agencies is directed toward production. But if China continues to develop as it has over the past decade, the demand for agricultural technologies will increasingly move off-farm. Further increases in the use of offfarm inputs in agriculture, such as fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery, will stimulate increased demand for new technologies and know-how aimed at the input supply sector. Rising per capita incomes are resulting in a rapid increase in the demand for processed agricultural products; this in turn will stimulate the demand for postharvest technologies related to the storage, processing, packaging, and marketing of agricultural produce. China's existing research capacity in input supply and, particularly, postharvest technology is embryonic. Private research could fill much of this gap, given that much of the required technological and market development is more amenable to private initiatives.
Considering the increasing fiscal constraints facing the Chinese national agricultural research system, multinational agribusiness and R&D firms can be called upon to play a greater role in the growth of Chinese agriculture. But this will not happen spontaneously. A number of significant policy and administrative changes are needed to improve the environment for these firms before they are likely to play a larger role. These include strict and transparent enforcement of IPR protection for agrochemicals, veterinary pharmaceuticals, plant and animal genetics and biotechnology, and other agricultural technologies, to reassure investors that theft of proprietary technology will not be tolerated. The legal framework is in place, but its enforcement remains uncertain (Koo et al. 2003 ). The restrictions on foreign direct investment in improving grain, oilseed, and cottonseed varieties also need to be removed. These restrictions have hindered investment and technology transfer and prevent Chinese farmers from accessing the newest internationally developed seed varieties. The current policy also requiring that Chinese partners must have a majority share in domestic marketing enterprises makes transnational firms reluctant to manufacture high-technology products because they cannot control product distribution. Firms that manufacture agricultural inputs need the opportunity to market their products directly to farmers. Market competition would improve distribution efficiency.
Regulations dealing with foreign direct investments by transnational firms should be more transparent. Domestic taxation schedules, import tariffs, and foreign exchange rules are adequately defined. However, application and approval procedures are complex, requiring separate negotiations with officials in each province in which investment and operations are proposed. There is also a problem of changing the rules after investments have been made: while such changes may be necessary for equity or other reasons, provision should be made for grandfathering the foreign enterprises over an adjustment period.
The Chinese agricultural research system has experienced dramatic change over the past several decades and now represents one of the world's largest public agricultural R&D institutions. For the past 15 years, the system has also pursued an aggressive reform agenda and has achieved substantial success. However, further reforms are still required to transform the system into a modern and efficient powerhouse propelling Chinese agriculture into the new century.
